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Three years have passed since the creation of the European Anti-Fraud
Office (known as OLAF from the French acronym). Two-and-one-half years
ago, I took up office as Director General of OLAF. This third Activity Report
summarises what we have achieved in operational terms in the 12 months
ending  June 2002. Our work programme for the next year will build on these
foundations.
Our core activity is the conduct and coordination of anti-fraud operations to
protect the EC Budget and the investigation of fraud and illegal activities
within the European Institutions. As chapter 1.3 of this report shows, there
has been a significant increase in the number of cases handled by OLAF
during this period.
OLAF was born at a difficult moment for the European Union. The legislator
opted for a mixed organisational structure for the new Office: a body within
the European Commission, but with operational independence and a degree
of budgetary and administrative autonomy. Although this arrangement has
presented certain difficulties, we have been successful in achieving a number
of goals.
 OLAF has achieved administrative and budgetary autonomy.  In particular, I
am pleased to report that the Commission has scrupulously respected my
operational independence. It has not been necessary to call upon OLAF’s
Supervisory Committee to exercise its primary function of safeguarding that
independence. OLAF has, however, continued to benefit from the
Supervisory Committee’s experience, advice and support.
What OLAF now needs above all is a period of stability. This may be
difficult to achieve at a time in which the entire structure of EU Institutions,
and their complex interrelationships, is again under review. We must,
however, have time to absorb the progress which has been made without the
disruption to anti-fraud operations which results from continuing change and
uncertainty.The main management structures for running an Office of more than 300
people are now in place. Recruitment continued at a fast pace during the
period covered by this Report, both to fill new posts and to replace staff that
left.  Highly skilled and experienced staff have been appointed to fill the
specific needs of the Office. The budgetary authority’s decision to delay the
attribution of new posts in 2001 and to impose changes in the professional
profile of many of those posts has led to a delay in the completion of our
recruitment exercise. This will have a long-term impact on our staffing
profile. We hope, nonetheless, to be close to the target by the end of 2002.
I am particularly pleased that, notwithstanding numerous obstacles placed in
our path, I was finally able to appoint the Director for Investigations and
Operations.
We have also progressed with the installation of management systems that
ensure transparency in our processes.  We have developed clear rules for the
processing of operational information which guarantee the rights of persons
under investigation, while also ensuring that successful prosecution in
national courts is not handicapped.
The main responsibility for the protection of the financial interests of the
Community remains with the Member States.  There are, however, many
points at which the chain of action against criminals who operate across
national borders is liable to be broken, in a network where numerous national
investigation and judicial authorities operate under 17 different legal
systems. OLAF’s job is to prevent such breakdowns in the chain within  our
field of responsibility. OLAF seeks to use its position at the centre of this
network to add value to the efforts of the Member States by providing a
“platform of services”, many of which are described in this Report.
Success or failure in the fight against fraud is not simply a question of the
number of investigations conducted, cases transmitted to the Commission’s
disciplinary office, files submitted to national prosecution authorities, or
criminal activities deterred or disrupted.  Our success will be determined by
the effectiveness with which we play our role at the centre, to foster
cooperation between national authorities; by distilling and applying the
lessons we have learned through experience; and by the construction of trans-
European anti-fraud structures, legislative, administrative and judicial, which
will become increasingly effective as time goes on. This is particularly
important as enlargement approaches.
OLAF therefore also welcomes the opportunity to cooperate with other
bodies which have responsibility for addressing criminal activity, such as
Eurojust and Europol. These bodies also have complex institutional
relationships which must not stand in the way of effective cooperation to
protect the financial interests of Europe.The fight against fraud must lead to visible results: fraudsters punished,
stolen money recovered, damage to the functioning and reputation of
institutions repaired. This requires professionalism in the handling of cases.
The guilty must not escape as the result of procedural error. This also
requires the efficient allocation of our limited resources, so that OLAF
concentrates its efforts on those areas where we can achieve the greatest
impact.
In this connection, I am convinced that the operational expertise which
OLAF is acquiring provides a unique contribution to the debate on the future
European Prosecutor.  This is because OLAF has three critical strengths in
the fight against financial and economic crime targeting the European Union
and its finances: the capacity to work alongside national law enforcement
authorities; the powers and the specialised knowledge to conduct operations
within the institutions; and the strategic ability to influence the development
of the relevant policy and legislation which flows from our status as a service
of the Commission. The Office’s experience has an essential role to play in
the debate on this issue. I shall ensure that we do so.
Director-General OLAF
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Our Objective
The mission of the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) is to protect the financial
interests of the European Union, to fight fraud, corruption and any other illegal
activity, including misconduct within the European Institutions that has financial
consequences. In pursuing this mission in an accountable, transparent and cost-
effective manner, OLAF aims to provide a quality service to the citizens of Europe.
Our Methods and Means
The European Anti-Fraud Office achieves its mission by conducting, in full
independence, internal and external investigations. It also organises close and regular
co-operation between the competent authorities of the Member States, in order to co-
ordinate their activities for the protection of the Communities’ financial interests and
the fight against fraud. OLAF supplies Member States with the necessary support and
multidisciplinary technical know-how to help them in their fight against economic
and financial crime. It strives to contribute to the design of the European strategy for
the fight against fraud and illegal activities and takes the necessary initiatives to
strengthen the relevant legislation.
Our Principles
The Office’s activities will be carried out with integrity, impartiality and
professionalism, and will, at all times, respect the rights and freedoms of individuals
and be fully consistent with the law.7
1.  INVESTIGATION ACTIVITY
1.1.  Overview
The period covered by this Report reflects steady growth in OLAF’s principal area of
business, the investigation of suspected fraud against the financial interests of the
European Community
1. This has resulted in growing pressure on OLAF’s human
resources, notwithstanding the additional staff who joined over the course of the
year. In order to manage this growing caseload, work has continued over the year on
the development of a formal system for prioritising incoming cases. The work
programme for 2003 will include a full description of the priority criteria as
implemented.
Over the last year, OLAF gave high priority to two types of cases. First, OLAF
operated a policy of “zero tolerance” towards corruption or fraud within the
European Institutions.  This meant that all allegations made in this area were
investigated, even where the source was questionable or the amount of money at
issue was minimal. This policy is resource-intensive but was judged necessary in the
interests of the reputation of the European Institutions. Second, OLAF gave
particular attention to cases involving the applicant countries. This covers both cases
involving the misuse of EC funds directed towards the enlargement process and
cases where activities affecting the interests of the EU are in some way linked to the
candidate countries. OLAF is particularly keen to develop its working relationship
with the Anti-Fraud Co-ordination Structures in the candidate countries.
In addition, OLAF has been working with a wide range of departments in Member
States as well as specialist fraud offices in such entities as the World Bank and the
United Nations in investigating financial irregularities and fraud. There has been
increasing liaison with Interpol, Europol, Eurojust and the European Judicial
Network.
1.2.  Analysis of Investigation Activity
A significant increase in the number of cases opened and dealt with by the Office has
occurred over the course of the current reporting period. In measuring the increase,
one must be aware that the figures include investigations which OLAF inherited
from UCLAF. Because UCLAF did not have the same breadth of responsibilities as
OLAF and its system of recording the opening and closing of investigations was less
uniform, any comparison between reporting years must be qualified. As the UCLAF
cases are closed, future reporting will reflect more accurately the workload of OLAF
and case trends. Notwithstanding this inconsistency in the figures, it is still clear that
there has been an increase in all types of cases. This increase can be explained by
several factors: the amount of fraud and its rate of detection may have increased;
OLAF’s work is becoming better known as the message is spread that “we are open
for business”; the European Institutions, Member States and third countries
increasingly understand the legal competence of OLAF and acknowledge it as the
body responsible for investigating fraud and financial irregularity against the
Community budget. The special role of OLAF as co-ordinator among the Member
                                                
1 The statistics in the present report cover 2 full half years, i.e. 1 July 2001 to 30 June 2002. The intention
is to adopt this practice as a statistical convention so as to ensure full comparability of data in
subsequent years.8
States, with the ability to offer assistance to national administrations in their
investigations, is also reflected in the greater demands made on OLAF’s resources.
1.3.  Statistical overview
During the reporting period OLAF has made a major effort to establish a reference
database for reliable and meaningful statistics. The investment of time and effort
required by this exercise was made in order to establish a statistical regime that can
be used for trend analysis in the years to come.
In order to achieve better comparability between the current activity report and the
Annual Report of the European Commission, which covers the full calendar year,
OLAF has modified its reporting period so that it covers two full half years, i.e. 1
July 2001 to 30 June 2002. In the future, this adjustment will allow OLAF to report
statistics by semester, and to make easy comparisons between the statistics of the
OLAF report and the Commission report.
On 30 June 2002, the end of the current reporting period, there were 2900 cases
stored in OLAF’s Case Management System (CMS). Of those, 1426 were inherited
from UCLAF, while 1474 were opened between 1
st June 1999, when OLAF was
created, and the end of this reporting period. 552 cases were opened during the
current reporting period. This indicates that OLAF’s caseload increased by
approximately 30% compared to the first two years. Figure 1.1 graphically represents
this situation:
Figure 1.1: Distribution of cases among the 3 reference periods
OLAF cases pre-
report period
922 (32%) Cases opened 
during the period
552 (19%)
UCLAF cases 
1426 (49%)
During the current reporting period, OLAF received information on 576 occasions,
which led to the registration of 552 new cases in the CMS. The reason for this
discrepancy is that with respect to several cases, information was received from more
than one source. The incoming information was broken down into five sources:
Note: Please note that the reference periods are of different lengths.9
125 (22%)
175 (30%)
37 (7%)
47 (8%)
192 (33%)
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
Figure 1.2 Distribution of incoming information by source 
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Figure 1.2 demonstrates that while most of the information came from the
Commission Services (approximately 30%), this was closely followed by the
Member States (22%), with the other European Institutions and the Freephone
providing 7% and 8% respectively of the information received. The 33% of
information that is grouped under “others” includes, for example, information
received from the public and the media.
Figure 1.3 shows the breakdown of incoming information by Member State and third
countries.
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Figure 1.3 Distribution of incoming information by Member State and 
third countries10
Figure 1.4 provides the breakdown of the 552 new cases by sector.
Figure 1.4 New cases in report period split per sector
Internal Cases
63 (11%)
Direct 
Expenditure
174 (32%)
Structural 
Funds
81 (15%)
Customs & 
Trade
112 (20%)
Agriculture
77 (14%)
Cigarettes & 
Excises
45 (8%)
OLAF cases can be registered in the CMS as being either in evaluation, under
investigation, in follow-up, or closed. Of the 552 cases that were initiated during the
reporting period, 174 cases were closed by the end of that period, 263 were under
investigation, and 115 were still in evaluation.
Figure 1.5 Breakdown of cases by type
Monitoring
cases
7 (2%)
Coordination
cases
101 (23%)
External
Investigations
118 (27%)
Assistance
cases
29 (7%)
Internal Cases
39 (9%)
Non-cases
143 (32%)
Figure 1.5 shows a breakdown of the 437 cases opened during the reporting period
by type: 118 are external investigations, 101 are co-ordination cases, 39 are internal
corruption cases, 29 are assistance cases, and 7 are monitoring cases. The latter type
was introduced during the last month of the reporting period. These terms are
described in the  annex to this Report, which also outlines the procedure for opening
cases.
The statistics set forth in Figures 1.1 through 1.5 are related to the reporting period
and will form the basis of future trend analysis. They do not reflect, however,
OLAF’s substantially larger caseload. In fact, as explained above, 922 cases were
initiated by OLAF before the reporting period. Within the category of active cases
(in evaluation or under investigation), 277 of these cases were closed and 177 were11
evaluated during the reporting period. Figure 1.6 shows the cumulative situation at
the end of the reporting period.
Figure 1.6 OLAF's backlog at 30 June 2002 by operational stage 
Open 
Investigation
326 (35%)
Closed
478 (52%)
In Evaluation
118 (13%)
The Director General of OLAF established a Task Force in 2001 with the mandate of
reviewing the cases inherited from UCLAF. Of the overall total of 1426 UCLAF
cases, 660 cases were still active at the beginning of the reporting period. The Task
Force closed 510 of these cases. With regard to the balance (less than 11% of the
UCLAF total), the Director General has appointed a magistrate to assess the
allegations. In addition, there will be a review of selected closed UCLAF cases, in
order to ensure that the basis for doing so was correct. The Office will continue to
dedicate the necessary resources to this professional clean-up exercise, which is
scheduled to be completed by the end of the reporting period 2002-2003.
In total, OLAF closed 961 cases during the reporting period. The stage of
investigation by reference period as of 30 June 2002 is summarised in Figure 1.7.
Figure 1.7 Stage of investigation by reference period as of 30/06/2002
Reference period Active cases Closed Total
OLAF reporting period
(1/7/2001-30/6/2002) 378 174 552
OLAF pre-reporting period
(1/6/1999-30/6/2001) 444 478 922
UCLAF
(before 1/6/1999) 150 1276 1426
Total 972 1928 2900
Note: These figures do not include the cases of the reporting period nor UCLAF cases.12
OLAF distinguishes between administrative, financial and legislative follow-up on
one hand and disciplinary and judicial follow-up on the other hand. Figure 1.8 shows
the distribution of the 241 cases that are currently in follow-up.
Figure 1.8 Cases in Follow-Up split by sector
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In most cases, responsibility for recovery of misappropriated funds, and in all cases,
judicial and disciplinary action, does not rest with OLAF. Prime responsibility rests
with the Member States or with the Institutions. OLAF’s primary task is to
investigate and then refer its findings to the relevant authority for the necessary
action. Specific units within OLAF assist in this process (see Chapter 3).
Figure 1.9 shows the situation of cases in the follow-up stage broken down by
reference periods.
Figure 1.9  Stage of Follow-Up by reference period as of 30/6/2002
Reference period Active Follow-Up
OLAF reporting period  (1/7/2001-30/6/2002) 10
OLAF  pre-reporting period (1/6/1999-30/6/2001) 53
UCLAF (before 1/6/1999) 178
Total 241
The timeframe for disciplinary, administrative and judicial action following an
OLAF investigation varies. Some cases are relatively straightforward and can be
processed quickly, others may require extensive inter-service consultation within the
Commission and/or contacts with national authorities in the Member States. There
may also be related action in national courts. It is therefore possible that the follow-
up stage may take considerably longer to conclude than the investigation itself.13
Figure 1.10 summarises the operational activities of the Office by sector.
Figure 1.10  Caseload development in the Reporting Period
New cases Cases
evaluated
Non-
cases
Monitoring
cases
Investigations
opened
Closed with
Follow-Up
Closed
without
Follow-Up
Internal cases 63 58 13 0 115 2 32
Direct
Expenditure 174 217 85 2 320 44 47
Structural
Funds
81 78 28 5 367 124 114
Customs &
Trade 112 214 21 1 464 37 178
Agriculture 77 79 41 1 109 8 23
Cigarettes &
Excises 45 109 9 0 228 18 123
Total 552 755 197 9 1603 233 517
1.4.  Internal investigations
During the reporting period, the Office dealt with the majority of the European
Institutions on internal cases. Co-operation with the institutions is good and
improving. The speed with which documents are supplied or personnel made
available for interviews significantly affects the smooth conduct of an investigation.
Although the number of internal cases treated by the Office has increased, it is
difficult to draw general lessons from these investigations. Sometimes the established
facts and the modus operandi vary and seem more connected with the individual than
with a weakness in the system. Nevertheless, in several cases OLAF drew attention
to deficiencies in the organisation and in supervision, and made recommendations to
the institutions concerned to avoid repetition of the problem.
From time to time, it becomes apparent that attention should be focussed on
particular activities. One such area has been the construction and refurbishment of
buildings policy of the institutions; another has been Non-Governmental
Organisations (NGOs). Dedicated teams have been set up to deal with these files.
There were 154 internal cases at the end of the reporting period. Of those, 34 were
inherited from UCLAF, 57 were opened by OLAF before the reporting period, and14
63 new cases were opened during the reporting period, indicating a large increase in
the number of internal cases. Figure 1.11 graphically represents this situation:
Viewed by institutions concerned, Fig. 1.12 clearly shows that the large majority,
(more than 75%), concerns the European Commission.
Case Study
In March 2002, OLAF opened an internal investigation concerning an individual in a
very senior position with an EU institution. This case was opened following
allegations referred to the Office by a Member of the European Parliament in
February. Simultaneously the information was received from the institution
concerned.
Before opening the investigation, these allegations were thoroughly assessed. A
special investigation team was created, composed of an investigator, the Adviser for
internal cases and the Head of the Magistrates’ Unit. From the outset, this team
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Figure 1.12 Internal cases broken down by Institution concerned
Figure 1.11 Distribution of internal cases between the 3 reference 
periods
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Note: Please note that the reference periods are of different lengths.15
received full co-operation from the President and the Secretary General, and had
access to whatever information it required. Missions were executed in 4 Member
States. More than 15 persons were interviewed.
The investigation is continuing and should be concluded within the next month. A
specific target of the Office is to finish investigations as quickly as possible and the
Office has found that the strategy of putting together specialist teams to deal with
high profile cases helps to achieve this objective.
1.5.  External Investigation Cases
The largest number of cases the Office handles are external investigations. These fall
into several categories.
Direct Expenditure and External Aid
Unlike other external cases, Direct Expenditure and External Aid cases fall within
OLAF’s exclusive competence.
OLAF has initiated discussions with its counterparts in applicant countries as to how
they can collaborate to investigate cases. The objective is to ensure that
investigations are properly focussed, and efforts are not duplicated. To this end, the
Office is building a network of contacts with its operational counterparts in Eastern
Europe. This is a particularly pressing issue given that there were, on average, only
28 OLAF investigators to deal with all internal, direct expenditure, external aid and
structural funds cases for the reporting period. The proposal to create a network of
OLAF liaison officers in the Applicant States is currently being considered within
OLAF, however additional resources will be required to implement this initiative
properly.
OLAF is also exploring how to optimise the use of resources available at the level of
the law enforcement authorities in the Member States, such as the network of police
and customs liaison officers.
OLAF is working in close co-operation with its partners in other international
organisations, such as the United Nations and the World Bank, to develop a set of
investigative standards. Such standards will allow all investigators in these
institutions to exchange information more effectively, to work more closely together
and, if necessary, in joint teams, and to achieve results from its investigations which
can be used by all international partners. The following example shows the
difficulties and the results of cooperation between national judicial authorities within
the European Union.
Case Study
In August 1999, OLAF was informed that financing by the Luxembourg government
for an aid project in Africa was at the same time funded by the European
Community. Neither donor was aware of the other’s contribution. OLAF initiated an
investigation to determine whether different financing projects were the subject of a
double co-financing request. In fact, the investigation disclosed multi-sourced
funding for the same project from multiple donors with contributions exceeding the
amount proposed for the project.16
Involvement of four judicial authorities was enlisted by OLAF to carry out the
investigation: Luxembourg, Frankfurt and Brussels Prosecutors and the Serious
Fraud Office in London. OLAF co-ordinated all the authorities concerned.
Although the Serious Fraud Office was the lead authority in the investigation, for
legal reasons the case has now been taken over by the Belgian judicial authorities.
Because of the complexity of the case and the need to review dozens of aid
applications made by the Non-Governmental Organisation in question, the judicial
investigations are still ongoing.
Structural actions
Cases opened in this area involve predominantly the European Social Fund (ESF)
and the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF).
OLAF has increased its efforts to work in close cooperation with Member State
authorities and other Commission services by placing at their disposal the
information gathered at the Community level.
The majority of investigations were developed in close co-operation with the
administrative and national judicial authorities. The Office provided assistance
through approximately seventy contacts and/or operational meetings as well as the
transmission of eight reports.
The cases of fraud detected in this field normally involve the use of false invoices
and false declarations. Specific problems in the field of public contracts were also
identified, normally involving irregularities as to the criteria and procedures adopted
by the Commission and/or the Member States, in particular with respect to technical
assistance contracts.
The control systems set up by certain Member States sometimes revealed
weaknesses. This situation will be the subject of a more detailed analysis within
OLAF with the aim of putting forward possible corrective measures.
The example which follows demonstrates close co-operation between OLAF and
national judicial authorities (assistance case). The fundamental role of on-the-spot
checks carried out by the Office within the framework of external investigations is
also illustrated by this example.
Case Study
Following a complaint sent to the Commission, an analysis was made of information
gathered by OLAF’s Intelligence Directorate in co-operation with other Commission
services. The Office thereafter initiated an investigation concerning a suspected
irregularity concerning the selection and financing of projects by the European Social
Fund.
The complainant had registered his complaint with the national judicial authority,
which sought the assistance of the Office. Meetings were organised with the
Magistrate responsible for the case to discuss the various aspects of the investigation
and to establish the course of action. OLAF’s investigators were permitted to consult
and copy data that was relevant to the case.17
OLAF forwarded the file to the national judicial authority.
The national judicial proceedings led to the arrest of several individuals for
misappropriation, tax evasion, fraud, etc.
The fraudulent schemes relied upon involved falsification and over-invoicing
between the recipients and the subcontractors for sometimes non-existent services.
Only one part of the expenditure declared by the recipients could be justified.
The relevant Commission services were informed of these results, and thereafter
blocked any further financial transaction connected with the operational programs in
question.
Customs/ External trade
The Customs sector deals with cases involving all types of industrial and seafood
products, including drug precursors.
At the beginning of 2002, anti-dumping measures in force concerned 67 different
products, of which 25 were already subject to investigation by OLAF. Anti-dumping
duties may represent 30% or more of a product’s value, while the average customs
duties applicable are 3 to 4 %. The high level of duties leads dishonest economic
operators to anticipate, analyse, then seek to circumvent the regulations which would
raise the price of their products.
In the specific sector of fish, origin fraud and value fraud continue to occur. Both
types of fraud are a consequence of the high level of customs duties for fish products
(some in excess of 20%). This situation encourages dishonest operators either to
declare that the products originate in States where the rates which apply are more
favourable, or to undervalue the products in order to decrease the level of duties
owed. Community health requirements have also led certain operators to bypass the
rules and at the same time commit origin fraud.
The number of investigations notified by the Member States in the sector of textiles
and clothing products has decreased, apparently for two reasons: the progressive
liberalisation of the systems of textile quotas; and earlier and better prevention, due
in part to OLAF’s development of agreements with certain countries (for example,
Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia) for better administrative co-operation.
Case Study
Based upon information received from the UK customs authority in July 2000,
OLAF opened an investigation concerning imports into Europe of stainless steel wire
from the United Arab Emirates. Anti-dumping duties of up to 55.6 % were imposed
on such goods originating in India. Fraud was suspected, in particular on the basis of
an apparent diversion in the movement of these goods from India towards the United
Arab Emirates.
Although the two Member States most concerned were the United Kingdom and
Germany, others were also affected. Investigations undertaken by them confirmed
the suspicion of fraud.18
OLAF investigators on mission to the United Arab Emirates found proof not only
that the majority of the companies in question were not able to produce steel wire,
but also that they had imported such wire from India. The use of this information
continues. Until now, the level of unpaid duties established is approximately €6
million, of which €1.2 million have been recovered to date.
Agriculture
2
Activities in this sector during the reporting period concerned mainly the co-
ordination of cases between various Member States, and between Member States and
third countries. To a lesser degree, activities also included the direct investigation of
external cases.
The level of controls and management of programmes concerning agriculture aids
and subsidies in some Member States was poor. OLAF helped identify the failures
which led to irregular or fraudulent conduct. Examples of such cases are the long
term set-aside programmes in Greece and ongoing problems with milk quotas in
Spain and Italy.
During the reporting period over half of the cases in the agriculture sector were of
low monetary value and were referred to the Member States for follow-up action.
Case Study
On the basis of information received concerning possible abuse of the milk quota
system by certain Spanish companies, OLAF opened an external investigation.
In the course of this investigation, some of the companies involved refused to
comply with OLAF’s request to facilitate the copying of computer data. In response,
OLAF invoked Article 9 of Regulation No 2185/96, under which the Member State
concerned must provide OLAF with the necessary assistance to carry out its
functions. Accordingly, the Spanish Paying Agency (FEGA) was asked to take
appropriate measures to assist OLAF in obtaining the complete computer records. In
co-operation with OLAF's Magistrates’ Unit legal authorisation was thereafter
provided by the Spanish judicial authorities and the data was obtained. The data
evidenced irregular practices resulting in damage to the EU budget of approximately
€6 million. OLAF’s investigation report was forwarded to FEGA in order to initiate
the administrative procedures necessary to recover these funds. It was also forwarded
to the Anti-Corruption Special Prosecutor’s Office in Spain, as the economic
operators investigated may have made false declarations on the output and sale of
milk. The report also indicates that similar practices may have been followed by
other Spanish firms. The Spanish authorities have been asked to review their control
systems.
This case is a clear example of OLAF giving added-value to a Member State in the
fight against fraud with the expertise of its various component units (investigative,
computer forensics and judicial) being brought to bear on a multi-faceted case of
fraud. In this regard, the advice of the OLAF Magistrates’ Unit was vital in obtaining
the appropriate judicial order in the Member State granting access to the companies’
computer data records. Great credit is also due to the Spanish authorities whose
                                                
2 For the sake of consistency, the cases under this heading bear on EAGGF-Guarantee expenditure and
agricultural trade (export subsidies).19
assistance to OLAF proved invaluable in this case, and demonstrated clearly what
can be done when OLAF and Member States work closely together and exploit fully
the control obligations and possibilities contained in the EU regulations.
Cigarettes, VAT and Excise Duties
The trends during the year have confirmed that the type of fraud committed is
becoming more complex, and the fraudsters are prepared to go to greater lengths to
conceal their activities. Because of the sizeable profits which can be made, it is no
hardship to the fraudsters to move containers of cigarettes through several countries,
and unload and reload the cigarettes several times. As OLAF’s cooperation with
certain third countries increases, the fraudsters move their operations. They select
other countries with which the Commission does not presently have cooperation
agreements, and/or which have no real interest in helping OLAF to pursue its
investigations, or with which effective cooperation is very difficult to establish.
Investigations in these areas are never for the sole benefit of the Community. Rather,
the Office is a major "service provider" to Member States and third countries. In the
field of cigarette fraud, the Office has worked closely with the enforcement and
judicial authorities of the Member States to identify the organisers of smuggling, to
support the Member States in carrying out investigative missions and executing
letters of request, and to provide information about suspect cigarette movements,
companies and persons. In such cases the contribution of OLAF may be prevention,
deterrence as well as the recovery of evaded customs duties and national taxes.
The act of seizure of cigarettes secures the goods and prevents their being introduced
into the EU market without payment of the appropriate revenue. The potential
revenue loss thus prevented, there is no resulting loss to the Community budget. In
such cases, the task of the Member States together with OLAF is to determine
whether the seizure is part of a wider smuggling scheme and if so, to terminate it.
The goal is, therefore, identification, disruption and prosecution of the individuals
behind the smuggling; prevention of future smuggling; and improvement in the level
of knowledge and cooperation for OLAF, Member States and third countries.
OLAF has coordinated a civil action lodged in New York by the European
Community and ten Member States against the American cigarette manufacturers
Philip Morris and RJ Reynolds. This has involved close cooperation with the
Member States, the undertaking of missions to gather evidence, cooperation with US
Customs and the customs services of third countries, and close cooperation with the
Commission Legal Service. The alleged smuggling schemes designed by the
cigarette companies have caused sizable damage to the Community and national
finances over the past ten years. The beneficial effects of the civil action have
already been demonstrated by the vastly lower level of smuggling of American
cigarettes into the EU in recent years.
VAT
OLAF has provided coordination and assistance services to certain Member States.
Major international VAT fraud, particularly carousel fraud, is often carried out by
individuals who are also involved in other types of fraud. VAT fraud is also a serious
problem for the Candidate Countries. OLAF must cooperate with these countries
(along with the Member States) to address the problem. The objective of the VAT20
activity is to enable the Member States' enforcement and judicial authorities to obtain
information which can be used to prosecute offenders and recover evaded taxes.
Case Study
The Office supported Dutch authorities in a criminal investigation initiated in March
2001 concerning a VAT carousel fraud involving computer components (CPUs). The
Dutch judicial authorities were investigating a criminal organisation which uses a
group of companies in several Member States and in third countries. Almost all of
EU customers were "missing traders" who became the subject of administrative
and/or judicial investigation by the authorities of the Member States concerned.
Dutch authorities should soon complete the criminal investigation. The loss of VAT
is estimated to be in excess of €30 million for the years 1999 and 2000.
Another case concerned the application of the "margin scheme" to sales of used cars.
There is a sizable market for international sales of used cars between many Member
States. Among these, Italy holds a significant share. The suppliers of used cars
inform their customers whether VAT has previously been paid on each of the
individual vehicles being traded. If so, any VAT due on the subsequent sale will be
based solely on the margin.
OLAF received information indicating that several VAT carousels had been created
throughout Belgium, Luxembourg and Italy. This fraud appeared to be perpetrated by
a Luxembourg company giving false indications that the margin scheme should
apply to cars bought in Belgium and eventually sold into the Italian market. This
produced a loss of tax, as well as economic distortions, because many cars were sold
at prices lower than the market price.
OLAF promoted a joint administrative operation carried out simultaneously by the
Belgian and the Italian tax authorities. Their on-the-spot checks led to evidence that
most of the traded vehicles had never borne the correct VAT, and that false
statements had been made by the Luxembourg company. OLAF’s coordination
efforts allowed the Member States concerned to act expeditiously to recover evaded
VAT and to prosecute suspects in Italy.
This initiative by the Office led to the discovery of almost 1,800 intra-Community
transactions of cars falsely described as margin scheme sales during the period from
January 1999 to April 2002. This amounts to a turnover of about €16 million, and
VAT not paid to the Italian State of about €3 million.
Alcohol
Fraud in this area normally involves intra-Community operations which affect the
financial interests of the Community via their effects on the VAT resource and their
adverse impact on legitimate trade. OLAF has devoted limited resources to this
activity during the year, but is prepared to provide services to the Member States
(and third countries) when needed.21
2.  INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY
OLAF Directorate C was created in September 2001. Entitled “Intelligence,
Operational Strategy and Information Technology”, the Directorate brings together
the former intelligence and IT units, reflecting the central role which information
technology plays in intelligence work.
2.1.  Strategic intelligence
The principal tasks in this field have included:
•   Improving the accuracy of OLAF’s annual statistics on irregularity and fraud
affecting the Community budget drawing on  information on irregularities which
Member States transmitted to the Commission;
•   Renegotiating contracts for access by both OLAF and Member States authorities
to commercially available databases;
•   Making progress in the exploitation of open sources through the Internet;
•   Monitoring trade patterns in sensitive goods;
•   Studying in depth the patterns of irregularity concerning a main area of the
Budget.
In addition, contacts have been strengthened with police and customs intelligence
branches of a number of Member States, with Europol and with the World Customs
Organisation.
2.2.  Operational intelligence and information support
The principal activities involved assistance to Member States and to OLAF
investigators across a range of areas:
•   The Information Support Office provided operational support in three major
surveillance operations (Operations Sinbad, Scorpio and West). Accession
countries participated for the first time in a Community-driven, intelligence-
based maritime surveillance operation;
•   During Operation SCORPIO, OLAF established mechanisms which led to the
identification of two shipments of smuggled cigarettes that had not been singled
out for examination under any of the risk selection criteria previously applied by
the Member State in question;
•   The project “One seizure, one report” addressed the need to enter the same
information about seizures of cigarettes into several systems. OLAF and the
World Customs Organisation (WCO) worked together to avoid duplication;
•   OLAF  provided technical support for internal investigations as well as for some
external services in forensic computer examination including copying and
analysing the content of computers;22
•   OLAF provided within one week a technical solution to scanning some 80.000
documents and making the results available in a searchable electronic form for
use by participating Member States with respect to an operation in Germany;
•   OLAF Intelligence wrote a special software application to demonstrate that a
company was over-charging the Commission for providing information and
advice to the public on EU-related questions in Sweden by exaggerating the
number of enquiries received. Analysis showed that a substantial number of the
E-mail addresses claimed to be used did not exist and another substantial number
of the addresses had only been created in order to pose the question.
2.3.  Information technology
The tasks of OLAF’s Information Technology Unit are:
•   To establish, maintain and operate the IT infrastructure of the Office with a
particular view towards IT security;
•   To develop, maintain and support the necessary IT systems for the collection and
processing of fraud-related information; and
•   To provide services and assistance to the Member States for AFIS/CIS (Anti-
Fraud/Customs Information Systems).
During the reporting period, a solid IT architecture has been established in order to
build trust in data collection, data storage and analysis.
The IT Unit has contributed to the computerisation and modernisation of OLAF’s
internal procedures. Full-text search and comprehensive structure search in OLAF's
Case Management System is possible as a result of these efforts. A first version of a
data analysis system has been developed (OASYS,  OLAF  Analysis  SYStem)
allowing selected users to produce timely statistics of OLAF’s investigative
activities.
In July 2002, the Director General created a Working Group to review the Case
Management System and to conduct a feasibility study for the introduction of an
Electronic Document Management System at OLAF.
2.4.  Information exchange with  Member States
The principal means of co-operation with the Member States is through the Mutual
Assistance Agreement and AFIS/CIS (Anti-Fraud/Customs Information System).
More than 3000 active users on more than 800 AFIS terminals have exchanged an
average of 2500 messages per day. OLAF is committed to improving AFIS and has
awarded several new contracts for this purpose.
OLAF has made progress with the development of the Customs Information System
in co-operation with the Member States, several of whom have seconded technical
experts to OLAF to help with this task.
Fig. 2.1 illustrates the breadth of OLAF’s responsibilities and how the different legal
acts are implemented in a common IT architecture. This is the architecture of the
AFIS (Anti-Fraud Information System) which implements Council Regulation (EC)23
515/97 on mutual assistance in the customs area and the CIS Convention. OLAF also
collects and analyses fraud-related data through the Electronic Communications
Registry, which enables secure exchange of text between Member States and OLAF.
Figure 2.1 – The Legal Basis as implemented through AFIS
Customs related activities are governed by Council Regulation (EC) 515/97. This
provides for the Customs Information System (CIS), Maritime Surveillance
(MARSUR), Early Warning System for Customs (EWS-C), Maritime Information
(MARInfo, YACHTInfo), Early Warning System for Excise (EWS-E), and
Information on Cigarette Seizures (CigInfo). It also constitutes the legal basis of
AFIS Mail, which allows secure exchange of text between AFIS partners.
Within the context of Council Regulation 515/97, a number of Commission
Regulations and Committee decisions provide for the exchange of structured
information in a range of areas. These constitute the legal basis for the AFIS modules
that are used by the Member States for reporting to the Commission. These modules
include the Agriculture Funds Module (EAGGF Communications), the EAGGF
Operators Module (in development), the Structural Funds Module and the Cohesion
Funds Module. Finally, the Mutual Information System (MIS) deals specifically with
meat exports to Russia, an area of very high risk to EC funds. It is based on the MIS
Administrative Arrangement between OLAF and the Russian Federation. More than
7000 messages were exchanged during the first year of operation.
The  CIS Convention foresees the creation and operation of a Central Customs
Information System to cover the Third Pillar competencies (e.g. drugs, money
laundering, etc). The Operations Control Unit (OCU) is established at regular
intervals to run specific anti-fraud exercises involving Member States and third
countries. Such exercises are increasingly “virtual”, meaning that there is no physical
central control room staffed by all participants. Where the OCU involves third pillar
operations, these use parts of the AFIS infrastructure (3
rd pillar CIS) without
intervention by OLAF.24
OLAF is collaborating with the Member states to simplify and clarify the legal bases
for the Member States' exchange of information in the various EC policy sectors.25
3.  SUPPORT AND ENHANCEMENT OF OPERATIONAL RESULTS
3.1.  Strengthening the judicial dimension
OLAF is committed to strengthening the judicial dimension in the fight against fraud,
in line with the Overall Strategic Approach of the Commission of 28 June 2000
(COM (2000) 358 final). This requires OLAF to guarantee the legality and quality of
the procedures, including the criminal dimension, and to coordinate effectively the
Member States prosecution authorities.
To this end, OLAF's lawyers provide advice as to the development of its general
investigative methodology, and translate that methodology into practical guidance
for the investigators. Legal advice is also provided in specific cases requiring the
interpretation of the Community legal framework governing OLAF’s performance of
its investigative tasks, such as respect for the fundamental rights of those under
investigation, protection of personal data, professional secrecy, extent of immunities
and access to documents.
OLAF does not have power either to prosecute cases before the courts of the
Member States, or to conduct disciplinary proceedings within the European
Institutions. When an investigation suggests that prosecution or disciplinary
proceedings (or both) may be appropriate, OLAF transmits the file to the relevant
authority. It is therefore important for OLAF to carry out investigations in a manner
which abides by the requirements of the judicial process in the Member State(s)
concerned. The Magistrates’ Unit ensures that proper legal assistance and support is
given at all stages of the investigation process to meet the requirements of national
law. This guards against the risk that procedural error might prejudice a possible
future prosecution.
Three separate procedures for conducting interviews in the course of investigations
have been established. These procedures take account of the different legal positions
of people interviewed and aim to achieve both effectiveness and protection of
fundamental rights. Legal advice is also provided to assess the legitimacy of
complaints made by persons subject to investigation by OLAF.
OLAF works in close co-operation with the Legal Service of the Commission when
actions are brought before the Community Courts which involve OLAF’s legislative
framework, its independence and the follow-up of its investigative actions.
3.2.  Legislative follow-up
The operational phase of the work of OLAF ends with the completion of the
investigation report. However, the investigation may have identified weaknesses in
legislation or in control systems, even if fraud was not detected. The function of
"legislative" follow-up is to exploit these lessons so that existing legislation is
improved and new legislation takes full account of experience. For example,
agreements with third countries are now negotiated so as to include stronger
administrative and financial cooperation clauses to address the problem of false
declarations of origin of goods. Given this experience, the Commission has entrusted26
OLAF with the establishment of a system of “fraud proofing”
3 to strengthen the
preventative aspect of the protection of the financial interests of the Community.
OLAF’s lawyers also draft proposals for legislation to address problems which fall
within the Commission's sphere of competence, and provide advice on the
establishment of practical arrangements for co-operation with other bodies such as
Europol and Eurojust.
3.3.  Administrative and financial follow-up
Administrative follow-up aims to identify lessons of a non-financial nature from
operational activity, and ensures compliance with the obligations derived from
Community or national law. The recommendations resulting from the OLAF
investigation may be addressed to national administrations, for example to modify
their control systems for the protection of the Community’s financial interests.
When an OLAF investigation has detected irregularities, including frauds, the
investigation report constitutes the base for recovery action by the Member States or
by the Commission, depending on who managed the expenditure. Beyond the simple
transmission of the investigation report for the recovery, OLAF provides its case-
related expertise to those responsible for the recovery of the money at stake.
In the field of Own Resources, the Office ensures, in cooperation with DG Budget,
the financial follow-up of closed cases and collects information on the recoveries
carried out by the Member States. OLAF collaborates with DG Budget to make a
detailed analysis of certain selected cases.
In the area of structural measures and the EAGGF-Guarantee section, management is
shared with the Member States. The follow-up carried out in these areas consists
primarily of establishing the necessary contacts with the responsible Commission
departments to ensure that the appropriate measures are actually taken. OLAF is also
consulted by the lead departments of the Commission before the formal closure of
individual structural programmes
In the agricultural area (EAGGF Guarantee Section), the follow-up covers both cases
communicated by the Member States within the framework of their regulatory
obligations under Council Regulation (EC) 595/91 and cases handled by the Office
(whether by investigation or coordination).
When the Member States are responsible for recovery actions, OLAF ensures that
they communicate the detected irregularities in compliance with their legal
obligations and that they update this communication so that the Commission can
publish an overview in its report on the Protection of the financial interests of the
Communities and the fight against fraud.
The follow-up in the field of direct expenditure (expenditure managed directly by the
Commission) involves contacts with the authorising Directorates-General and the
Accounting Officer of the Commission. It may also involve safeguarding the
Commission’s position for any civil court action which may be necessary to recover
funds. Following the communication which the Commission adopted on
                                                
3 See Commission Communication of 7 November 2001 concerning the fraud-proofing of legislation and
contract management (SEC (2001) 2029 final).27
administrative reform, OLAF created a new unit responsible for the financial aspect
of the follow-up of irregularities in the field of direct expenditure.28
4.  INTERNAL ORGANISATION, TRAINING AND COMMUNICATION
4.1.  Administrative structures
OLAF’s administrative structure was revised in February 2002.  The main changes
were as follows:
•   Magistrates’ Unit was placed directly under the Director  General;
•   within Directorate A, the unit responsible for administrative and financial follow-
up, anti-fraud legislation and recovery was split into three new units to reflect the
scale and importance of these tasks.
Within Directorate C, the intelligence unit was divided into two units, one for
strategic intelligence and one for operational intelligence. This structure is designed
to enhance OLAF’s function of providing a platform of services, thereby
strengthening partnership and co-operation with the Member States.
During the period covered by this Report, the Office faced a number of difficulties in
completing its planned programme of recruitment:
•   the decision of the budgetary authority not to authorise a number of new posts
until the end of 2001, and uncertainty as to the number  of posts available in each
category and grade, and as to their distribution between officials and temporary
staff, delayed the launching of recruitment procedures;
•   the redeployment in the autumn of 2001 of a number of officials from OLAF to
other Commission departments abruptly reduced the number of posts available to
OLAF and was followed by further departures of experienced OLAF officials
who obtained posts elsewhere;
•   finally, the delay in the arrival of the Director of Investigations and Operations
led to delays in completing the management structure of this Directorate.
Over the period as a whole, 38 individuals left OLAF and 77 individuals joined
OLAF.  Arrangements were made to recruit staff to the remaining 76 vacant posts,
mainly in categories B and C, by the end of 2002.
4.2.  Anti-fraud training activities
OLAF arranges anti-fraud training activities for its own staff and for its operational
partners. Improved training both of new arrivals and of OLAF’s existing staff was
one of the Office’s priorities for this period. A training programme was devised to
complement the professional knowledge of OLAF officials, highly qualified in their
field (police, judicial, financial, customs, agricultural inspectors etc), by providing
them with the tools to work in OLAF’s multicultural environment and within the
European institutions.
The Office’s external anti-fraud training activities form an integral part of the
"service platform" concept. They reflect the Office‘s overall priorities including
preparation of applicant countries for accession, promotion of the Green Paper on
criminal-law protection of the Community’s financial interests, operation of  the29
AFIS system and protection of the euro. All training activities are systematically
evaluated.
Over the period of this Report, OLAF helped organise and/or co-financed 28
seminars.  These included 13 organised in collaboration with national partners such
as police or customs authorities, 3 with the OLAF-Poland Office, 3 with TAIEX and
9 with the European lawyers' associations.  Over 1,600 people attended these events.
Lastly, OLAF participated in a further 130 conferences and seminars to which it did
not make a financial or organisational contribution.
4.3.  Communication and information strategy
OLAF supports its operational independence with its own communication strategy.
The objective is to be as open as possible within the constraints prescribed by
national and Community law, the need to protect investigations, and respect for the
fundamental rights of the suspect
During the period in question there were several hundred interviews or other contacts
between OLAF’s Director-General or the OLAF Spokesman and members of the
media. The OLAF web-site has been improved to provide the general public with
basic information about OLAF. An internet pressroom has also been established.
In 2001, OLAF established the OLAF Anti-Fraud Communicators' Network
(OAFCN) which brings together many spokesmen and other responsible for public
relations, as well as information officers in national law enforcement agencies with
which OLAF co-operates. The objective is to improve the level of communication
with the European citizen on the protection of the Community’s financial interests.30
5.  COOPERATION WITH THE OFFICE’S PARTNERS IN THE FIGHT AGAINST FRAUD
5.1.  Fight against euro counterfeiting
Apart from its legislative and training functions, OLAF has a technical operational
responsibility in the area of the protection of the euro. This relates to the protection
of euro coins against fraud and counterfeiting.
Community law assigns responsibility for euro coins mainly to the Member States.
However, it is necessary to achieve a comparable level of protection against fraud
and counterfeiting in the Member States, which have invited the Commission to co-
ordinate their actions for the protection of euro coins. The Commission has therefore
established the Counterfeit Coins Experts’ Group, which is managed and chaired by
OLAF. This brings together experts from all Member States, the European Central
Bank (ECB) and Europol to ensure implementation of the technical scheme for
handling counterfeit euro coins agreed by ECOFIN (the Council meeting in the
format of Finance Ministers).
The cornerstone of this technical scheme is the European Technical and Scientific
Centre (ETSC), which became operational in October 2001. As an independent
administrative entity, it is based in the Paris Mint and is managed by two OLAF
officials. The Paris Mint makes available to the ETSC its expertise on coin
counterfeiting.
The main task of the ETSC is the analysis and classification of counterfeit euro coins
presenting a higher degree of risk to EU citizens. Other tasks include direct technical
assistance to Coin National Analysis Centres and to police authorities; contributions
to the development of the database for counterfeits established at the ECB;
establishment of a register of coin-like objects that could be misused as euro coins;
and technical collaboration with the coin-operated industry.
The ETSC’s first report was issued in April 2002. Few counterfeit coins were
detected in the first six months of use. However, high quality counterfeit euro coins
are now beginning to emerge. The ETSC alerts the competent authorities and carries
out initial evaluations of the counterfeits.
In December 2001, the Council adopted the Commission/OLAF’s proposal for the
Pericles programme for the protection of the euro against counterfeiting. This
programme co-finances projects to raise awareness of the Community dimension of
the new currency. It also facilitates exchange of information and technical, scientific
and operational assistance. OLAF is implementing this programme in partnership
with the Member States. The total budget is €4 million over the period 2002-2005.
5.2.  Support to applicant countries
To ensure that the Community’s financial interests are effectively protected in the
candidate countries, both before and after accession, OLAF has supported the
Commission’s endeavours to reinforce their institutional capacity to prevent and
combat fraud. In particular, the Office has encouraged the candidate countries to
designate operationally independent anti-fraud co-ordination structures or services,
responsible for co-ordinating all legislative, administrative and operational aspects of31
the protection of the Communities’ financial interests within the country concerned.
Most candidate countries are already well advanced in the process of setting up such
structures or services.
In Poland, a PHARE-financed anti-fraud project has been implemented since 2001,
in close co-operation with OLAF. This project, with a budget of €3.5 million, is
aimed at setting up a horizontal, multi-disciplinary anti-fraud structure. An OLAF
official and three Member State experts have been detached to Warsaw to assist the
Polish authorities with the establishment of the anti-fraud co-ordinating service.
Although the project’s implementation has run up against several difficulties of a
local nature, it has provided useful insights about the management of institution-
building projects in the candidate countries.
During the reporting period, 27 cases were examined, and four investigations were
undertaken by the Polish authorities within the framework of the PHARE
programme. Seven cases were closed as no irregularities were found and 16 cases are
still under analysis. In addition, administrative cooperation between the OLAF team
and various Polish authorities resulted in the opening by OLAF of 4 investigations.
In one case in the agricultural sector concerning alleged abuse of PHARE money and
non-respect of the public procurement rules, OLAF investigators cooperated with
their Polish counterparts by assisting during joint visits of public bodies. This
investigation, which is still ongoing, has already resulted in the recovery of nearly
€3 million in Phare funds, and of tens of thousands of euro for the national budget. It
has also led to the review of the procedures for the issue of certificates of origin by
the national authorised bodies.  The Polish Prosecutor’s Office has opened criminal
procedures against former Polish officials.
Multi-country PHARE programme
Building on the experience gained in Poland, on 16 May 2002, the Commission
approved a multi-country PHARE programme to assist ten candidate countries in
establishing anti-fraud co-ordinating services or structures. OLAF has been closely
involved in the preparation of the project, and will assist with its implementation.
The implementation of the project should begin in early 2003. The Office is
considering the possibility of establishing liaison officers in some of the candidate
countries as of 2003.32
ANNEX
OLAF’s Investigation Procedures
1.  THE DIFFERENT TYPES OF CASES
The legislation under which OLAF operates distinguishes between internal
investigations and external investigations (Articles 4 and 3, respectively, of
Regulation N°1073/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council).
Internal investigations involve investigations within the European Institutions.
(There may nevertheless be links between suspected irregularities within the
Institutions and irregularities outside the institutions. Examples are corruption of
officials as part of a wider fraud in the contracting process or in the payment of
subsidies from the EC budget). Although the number of internal cases is a relatively
small proportion of the total, some of these cases are particularly complex and
significant. Thus, the overall proportion of OLAF's investigation resources devoted
to internal cases is relatively high.
External investigations are those outside the European Institutions.
For management and statistical purposes, however, OLAF distinguishes between a
number of different types of cases, all conducted under the powers relating to
external investigations. These are:
External cases, where OLAF provides the majority of the investigation
resources.
Co-ordination cases, where OLAF’s role is primarily to co-ordinate the
activities of other investigation authorities.
Criminal assistance cases, where OLAF is asked by the competent authorities
to assist them in conducting criminal investigations.
Two further categories of cases are:
Monitoring cases, where OLAF passes information to a national authority but
formally monitors the outcome to ensure that any lessons to be learnt are
identified and disseminated;
Non-cases, where OLAF decides not to open a case. OLAF’s policy is to take a
formal decision in the Board on whether to open an investigation into every
communication which it receives alleging that an irregularity may have been
committed. This is a resource-intensive process, but it gives the public the
assurance that allegations of fraud cannot be overlooked. Frequently, initial
examination of this material shows that there is no threat to Community funds
or breach of Community law, but that there may be a breach of national law,
such as evasion of national income tax or of national urban planning
restrictions. OLAF then classifies the case as a non-case and passes the
information to the national authorities, where appropriate. In other instances,
allegations are obviously without foundation or personal in character.  Such
cases are also classified as non-cases.33
2.  THE PROCESS OF INVESTIGATION
2.1.  Initial handling of information
All new communications about possible frauds which arrive at the Office are first
systematically registered in the CMS database, and allotted a sequential number
provided by the system which cannot be modified or deleted.
Once a communication has been registered in the CMS database it is automatically
given the status in evaluation. This is the pre-investigation phase, during which the
information received is subjected to a rigorous examination. Other information
sources available to the Office are consulted where appropriate, to determine
whether :
1.  the information at first sight is sufficient to demonstrate that the (financial)
interests of the EU may have been prejudiced; and
2.  there are sufficient grounds to justify the opening of an investigation.
2.2.  Decision on whether to open a case
The decision to open a case is taken by OLAF’s Board, under authority delegated by
the Director General. The Board is chaired by the Director of Investigations and
Operations. Representatives of the Policy, Legislation and Legal Affairs Directorate,
the Intelligence Directorate, and the Magistrates’ Unit sit together on the Board
alongside colleagues responsible for investigations, to ensure operational co-
ordination and consistency across the office. The Director General takes a small
number of decisions personally, for example where there is disagreement within the
Board, but retains ultimate responsibility for all decisions.
If the grounds for the opening of a case are not fulfilled, the file is closed as a ‘non-
case’.
2.3.  Stages in the lifecycle of a case
Open cases
After the initial evaluation phase, where the evidence appears to be sufficient to
warrant the opening of an investigation, a case is formally opened. The purpose of
the investigation is to determine whether a fraud or irregularity has been committed,
and if so, to estimate the impact on the Community budget where possible.
Closed cases
Closed – no-follow-up: Cases in which no fraud/irregularity has occurred and
for which no further action is taken.
Closed – with follow-up: Cases in which a fraud/irregularity has been
established, and follow-up action is needed, Directorate A or the Magistrates’
Unit of the Office assures the follow-up of the recommendations of the
investigation (i.e. that any relevant amounts are recovered, penal actions
carried out, etc.).34
Closed – follow-up complete: Cases where the necessary follow-up has been
completed.
At each stage of the investigation all significant information is systematically entered
in the CMS database in order i) to ensure that the case portfolio of the Office is
effectively managed and ii) to enable the office to fulfil its external reporting
requirements to the Supervisory Committee, the European Parliament and the
European taxpayer.